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Amnesty for contras In contrast to Guatemala and El Salvador, Nicaragua already had an amnesty
law on the books for years prior to signing the accords. Changes in amnesty procedures were
implemented, however, in the interest of making it more attractive for the contras. Whereas the
original amnesty program was administered solely by the Ministry of the Interior (MINT), the new
amnesty is offered through a national network of local civilian peace commissions designed to
address specific details of the program in each community. Under the previous amnesty procedures,
contras who disarmed went first to MINT, and were sometimes detained for questioning. At present,
contras contact any member of a peace commission and are reintegrated into the community
without interrogation or detention. In Region V (Boaco, Chontales, Nueva Guinea) alone, 55
commissions had been established by early October. The local commissions consist of community
leaders often Catholic priests and Protestant ministers, members of the Red Cross, and local
business leaders. Government representatives sit on some commissions, while in other cases, such
as the Pantasma Valley commission, members derive from the political opposition. In general, the
government invites individuals to be commission members, and each person chooses whether
or not to participate. Contra troops, according to recent deserters, do not speak of the amnesty
among themselves. Contras caught conspiring or attempting to escape to amnesty are executed by
their group commanders. By mid-November, the precise number of contras who had accepted the
amnesty was unclear. Foreign observers (such as Witness for Peace) reported that the number of
contras deserting during Oct. 7-Nov. 7 unilateral cease-fire was disappointing. Based on government
reports, it appears that about 800 had accepted amnesty since Aug. 7. The total includes 400
Miskito Indian rebels under commander Uriel Vanegas who agreed to end hostilities against the
government on Oct. 3. Amnesty for "political prisoners" Until recently, the Nicaraguan government
had attempted to adopt a policy of pardoning prisoners arrested for "lesser" national security
offenses, evaluating each case separately. On the one hand, the government faces condemnation
from party militants and a majority of the citizenry for even considering the release of National
Guardsmen and former contras responsible for massacres and other atrocities against the civilian
population. On the other, the Sandinistas have been subjected to a continual barrage of criticism
(from the US and domestic conservative groups) for their "totalitarian" refusal to define the
Somocistas and other murderers as "political prisoners." Cardinal Obando has stated on several
occasions that he favors a "general amnesty." Nonetheless, in early September, the government
announced it was reviewing lists of "thousands" of prisoners for eventual release. Although
never mentioned in the US media, many of the peace commissions throughout the country
have also been involved in soliciting pardons for individual prisoners from respective locales.
While the number of prisoners released via their efforts is unknown, there have been reports of
success. [Figures appearing in the US press on the number of political prisoners in Nicaragua
are largely fabricated. According to a detailed review by Americas Watch published in February
1987, Nicaragua harbored a miniscule number of political prisoners in the sense used in the
West. Reviewing the records of the Red Cross, Amnesty International, and its own investigations,
©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute.
All rights reserved.

Page 1 of 5

LADB Article Id: 075544
ISSN: 1089-1560

Americas Watch estimated that apart from common criminals, the prisons contained about 2200
National Guardsmen and 1500 people charged with security-related crimes (i.e., former contras
and contra collaborators). Next, Americas Watch also counted about 600 prisoners who were
former members of the Sandinista security forces. Most were charged with abusing civilians.
The Nicaraguan government's actions to punish "its own" on charges of abuse stand in marked
contrast to the Honduran, Salvadoran and Guatemalan "democracies." An often-cited Nicaraguan
source in the US media is the Permanent Commission on Human Rights (CPDH). The CPDH,
linked to the Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinator (CDN-"Coordinadora"), claims there are more
than 7,000 National Guardsmen and contras in Nicaraguan jails. (The Coordinadora was formed
in 1980 by three conservative parties. The coalition also consists of two trade union federations
and COSEP, the Superior Council of Private Enterprise. The CPDH receives US government
funds from the National Endowment for Democracy, funneled via Prodemca.)] Chronology of
major decisions on prisoner amnesty: Sept. 13: President Ortega announced decision to pardon
16 citizens of other Central American countries currently in prison on charges of collaborating
with the contras. Nov. 22: The Nicaraguan government released 985 prisoners, including about
200 former Guardsmen. According to the BBC, most had been sentenced to 30-year terms. [Note:
Capital punishment does not exist in Nicaragua, and the maximum prison sentence is 30 years.
It is noteworthy that when the Sandinistas came to power and rounded up members of Somoza's
National Guard, they were imprisoned rather than executed. In comparison to the behavior of
many newly-installed revolutionary governments world-wide (Cuba, for instance), the Sandinistas'
treatment of its arch-enemies was quite tolerant, "humanitarian." In addition, many militarydominated governments revolutionary or not use brutal force and execution in a routine manner
against persons and groups defined as "subversives" (enemies of the state). Included here are El
Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. Once again, Nicaraguan actions against its domestic political
opposition and contras taken alive on the battlefield are quite mild in comparison.] Jan. 16, 1988:
President Ortega announced in San Jose that his government would grant amnesty to all political
prisoners arrested after 1981 "immediately upon achievement of an effective cease-fire and the
incorporation of armed groups into civilian life." This amnesty could affect an estimated over 1,000
people who were charged with security-related crimes. There are about 2,000 National Guardsmen
remaining in prison. If no cease-fire is reached, said Ortega, Nicaragua would free the prisoners "if
the United States or any other non-Central American country decides to accept them." Predictably,
contras said they would meet with Ortega, but would not limit the talks to mechanics of a cease-fire.
National Reconciliation Commission, formation & activities In contrast to El Salvador, Guatemala
and Honduras, the commission in Nicaragua incorporated all political parties and factions existing
at the time, and discussions focused on substantive (read controversial) issues. In mid-December,
commission activities were brought to a standstill, result of the government's refusal to undertake
extraordinary procedures to make a series of changes in the Constitution. Instead, the government
turned the "constitutional reform" questions over to the National Assembly. The dissidents
within the commission demanded instead that the government act on the same before year-end.
Constitutional reforms as such are not required by the regional peace plan. Nicaragua established
the commission on Aug. 25, and was the first of the five signatory nations to do so. Members are
Vice President Sergio Ramirez Mercado (representing the government); Cardinal Miguel Obando
y Bravo (Church); Mauricio Diaz, head of the Popular Social Christian Party (opposition parties),
and Gustavo Parajon, head of a Nicaraguan relief agency ("neutral" respected citizen, with no
previous affiliation to government party, or government employment). Later, Cardinal Obando, an
outspoken critic of the Sandinistas, was appointed as head of the Commission. Partial chronology
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of major events: Oct. 5: At the first commission meeting for organizing dialogue with the domestic
political opposition, the 11 registered political parties were invited to name delegates. In addition,
the Coordinadora was invited. The Coordinadora presented a list of 14 delegations it insisted
should also attend. The list included not only its three registered parties, but the two factions
of the unregistered Conservative Party, a splinter group of the Social Christian Party (PSC), the
union federations, and each of the business chambers represented in COSEP. When President
Ortega rejected the Coordinadora's list the following week, all representatives of the coalition
excepting the official PSC, led by Erick Ramirez walked out. For reasons of its own, the Trotskyist
Revolutionary Workers Party also walked out. Oct. 15: The eight remaining parties attending a
commission meeting debated the representation issue for over eight hours. In the end the parties
agreed to permit representation of all dissident party factions a total of five and signed a letter
to President Ortega to that effect. In a separate letter signed by all parties but the PSC, it was
suggested that if dissident party faction representatives attended commission deliberations, the
Coordinadora as such should not be permitted another representative of its own. Oct. 28: By this
time, President Ortega had agreed to the seven parties' suggestion: if parties and party factions
within the Coordinadora were represented in the commission, the umbrella group could not
also have a delegate. Although the Coordinadora party representatives did not attend the Oct. 28
meeting, the other eight parties approved the 17 articles of the commission's by-laws. National
Assembly president Carlos Nunez, who was to preside over the meetings, reminded the delegates
that the government would be unable to effectively respond to issues if the opposition itself could
not come to some agreement. Nov. 3: Debate was scheduled to begin on substantive agenda points.
Nunez stated that any proposals that fall outside the scope of either Nicaragua's Constitution or
the Central American peace accords will be ruled inadmissible. This warning appeared aimed at
Coordinadora party representatives. Nunez also preempted the possibility of any new splinter
group or newly created party demanding participation in the commission. Declaring that the roster
was now closed, he said that anyone who returned to Nicaragua under the amnesty program in the
future would have the right to join the dialogue through the parties or groups already participating.
Dec. 15: Opposition political parties suspended commission debate indefinitely after rejecting as
inadequate the government's response to their proposals for constitutional reform. On Nov. 24,
14 opposition parties and party factions delivered a list of 17 constitutional reforms that would
"democratize" the constitution and comply with the peace agreement. Alongwith the Sandinista
National Liberation Front, only the Marxist-Leninist Popular Action Movement chose not to support
the proposed reforms. The "reforms" included a ban on presidential reelection, family succession
to the presidency and voting by members of the military. Other measures would limit presidential
power, establish politically nonpartisan armed forces, guarantee an independent judiciary and
define the separation of the military, the government and political parties. Cease-fire The peace
accords do not require any government in the region to enter into direct talks with insurgent groups.
Next, discussions regarding domestic political issues ("democratization") are specifically relegated
to domestic unarmed opposition groups, and insurgents who have accepted amnesty. As of Jan.
16, the Nicaraguan government had conceded to participation in direct talks with contra leaders to
discuss cease-fire mechanisms. Chronology of major events: Sept. 30: President Ortega announced
a month-long unilateral cease-fire in three departments to begin Oct. 7. Offensive operations were
suspended in Jinotega, Nueva Segovia and Zelaya. It was hoped that the cease-fire would provide
an opportunity for contras in those areas to accept amnesty. [During the Oct. 7-Nov. 7 period,
contras in cease-fire areas used the opportunity to receive and store large quantities of supplies,
and attack isolated targets outside the cease-fire zone. Results in terms of contra deserters were
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disappointing.] Early October: A fourth cease-fire zone was designated in the eastern coastal region
south of Puerto Cabezas. An agreement with local Indian leaders added a 400 sq.km. area along
the Rio Prinzapolka to a pacified territory of nearly 14,000 sq.km. on the northern part of the coast.
Nov. 6: The Nicaraguan government appointed Cardinal Obando to mediate in cease-fire talks
with the contras. Contra leaders had indicated they would accept indirect talks toward a cease-fire
if the mediator was to their liking. Calero said Obando was their first choice. Nov. 13: President
Ortega presented an 11-point cease-fire proposal to the Cardinal, who had tentatively accepted the
role of mediator. The proposal was reportedly developed with the assistance of House Speaker Jim
Wright (D-Tex.), and delivered in Wright's presence at the residence of papal nuncio Pio Laghi in
Washington. According to Ortega's proposal, the cease-fire would begin Dec. 5 and end on Jan. 5.
Three cease-fire zones were to be established within Nicaragua, encompassing a total area of about
10,000 sq.km. Fifteen days before the cease-fire would go into effect, the Nicaraguan army would
suspend operations to let contra forces move into the cease-fire zones. During the cease-fire period,
armed groups or individuals outside the zones and anyone violating its terms could be fired on by
the Sandinista army. Next, the contras would be prohibited from receiving any military aid during
the one-month period; food and clothing would be obtained via a neutral agency. On Jan. 5, the
contras would be expected to disarm in the presence of the peace accord's international verification
commission before receiving amnesty. At this point, the contras would have the opportunity to
participate in domestic politics, including the National Reconciliation Commission. Wright was
accompanied by Paul C. Warnke, who was director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Control
Agency in the Carter administration. The Speaker said Warnke had come to the talks after the
Nicaraguan government asked him to suggest public figures who could assist in negotiations. Nov.
30: The contras announced selected aspects of their own cease-fire plan, delivered to the Cardinal
in Managua last week. The plan called for a 41-day cease-fire beginning Dec. 8 and ending Jan. 17,
and simultaneous talks on political issues. Both sides' cease-fire plans were to be discussed Dec.
3 in Santo Domingo, the capital of the Dominican Republic, at the first indirect cease-fire talks
mediated by the Cardinal. The contra plan stated that "simultaneously with the initiation of the
cease-fire, the Sandinista regime shall comply, in accordance with the conditions stipulated" in the
regional peace plan. Among these "conditions" specified in the contra document were "general
amnesty," lifting the state of emergency, and "democratization," which includes press freedom,
ending subsidies to government news organizations, termination of the military draft, and the
dissolution of Sandinista neighborhood vigilance committees. The document also stated that contra
troops "will remain in control" of more than 30,000 square miles of Nicaragua's total 57,000 square
miles. According to a map included in the proposal, the Nicaraguan government was portrayed
as controlling a narrow strip of territory along the Pacific coast. The contra plan also proposed
that both sides disband their armies to form a new, smaller national troop. Dec. 4: Indirect talks
between the Nicaraguan government and the contras in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic,
reportedly reached a stalemate when Managua rejected a cease-fire proposal by mediator Cardinal
Obando on the grounds that it was incomplete. The Cardinal proposed that a 36-hour cease-fire be
observed on Dec. 7-8 when Nicaragua celebrates a major Catholic holiday, as well as a Christmas
truce from Dec. 22 to Jan. 6. During the cease-fire, both parties would "jointly implement democratic
measures." The Nicaraguan government would be expected to grant a "general amnesty," lift
the state of emergency and permit "all ideological groups" to operate their own press outlets in
Nicaragua. Deputy Foreign Minister Victor Hugo Tinoco said that in order for the proposal to be
acceptable it would also have to include the termination of all outside support to the contras. Dec.
22: In Santo Domingo, after seven hours of debate on the meeting's agenda, the contra delegation
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reportedly insisted on dealing directly with a Nicaraguan government official with decision-making
power. Representing the Nicaraguan government were lower-level officials and several advisers
and observers, including West German Social Democrat leader Hans Jurgen Wieschnewski, and US
attorney Paul Reichler. Consequently, the talks were stalemated. Observers pointed out that prior
to the meeting of the "technical teams," contra leaders had agreed to discuss cease-fire mechanisms
with the Nicaraguan government's designated representatives. Jan. 16, 1988: President Ortega
announced at a Central American summit in San Jose that his government would open direct ceasefire talks with the contras within the next few days. Predictably, contra leaders said they would meet
with the president, but that they would not limit discussions to the cease-fire. On "democratization"
provisions Until Jan. 16, the Nicaraguan government had argued that while it was willing to promote
certain elements of the democratization called for in the accords, lifting the state of siege, and
full press and political freedoms could not be implemented until the war with the contras was
terminated. Partial chronology of events: Aug. 25: The government announced that religious exiled
from the country in 1986 would be permitted to return. Sept. 2: Debate was initiated in the National
Assembly on autonomy legislation for Atlantic coast indigenous populations. The bill was drafted on
the basis of results from a multi-ethnic assembly held last April in Puerto Cabezas. This legislation is
unprecedented world-wide. Sept. 6: At a public rally organized by the Coordinadora, and attended
by more than 1,000 people in Chinandega, opposition supporters denounced the Sandinista
government. The police stood by but did not interfere. Early September: President Ortega rescinded
the law empowering the government to confiscate the property of any citizen who remained outside
of Nicaragua for more than six months (excluding properties seized from associates of Somoza or
expropriated under the agrarian reform). Sept. 20: The government announced that an order had
been released late Sept. 19 for the immediate reopening of La Prensa. Nicaragua was not required
to permit the reopening of the newspaper until Nov. 7. Sept. 22: President Ortega lifted a ban on
Radio Catolica. The government also gave a political opposition group permission to publish a
new weekly magazine, to be called Cronica. Sept. 27: Several thousand people march in Managua
in a demonstration organized by the Social Christian Party. Security officers watched but did not
interfere. Marchers chanted slogans demanding a "general amnesty" and an end to the draft. Oct.
4: The Coordinadora drew about 1,000 people to participate in a demonstration in the streets of
Masaya to demand that the government fulfill the peace accords. There were no incidents. Jan. 16,
1988: Nicaragua's state of emergency was suspended, as per an announcement by President Ortega
in San Jose.

-- End --
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